

20 July 1973

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Statement by [REDACTED] concerning
Allegations Made, this date,
by Samuel A. Adams, in Testimony
before the Senate Arms Services Committee

The Allegation

Although I have not seen the exact transcript, I have been told that Mr. Samuel A. Adams made some such remarks as these this morning: that some time in late 1971, after "his" estimate on Cambodian Communist Order of Battle had been rejected, his boss, "as punishment," had ordered him to work seven days a week, including Saturdays and Sundays.

It is also my understanding that when asked who his boss was, Mr. Adams replied, "[REDACTED] Chief of the Special Research Staff of the CIA." 25X1A

Comment

If Mr. Adam's testimony was indeed anything like the above, there is no truth whatsoever in his allegations.

At no time did I "reject" his Cambodian Communist O.B. estimate. At no time did I "punish" him or assign him extra duty. At no time did I ever order him to work seven days a week.

Discussion

I do not know why Mr. Adams would choose to make these remarks. I assume that they stem from faulty memory on his part; or, perhaps as part of a persecution complex he seemed to carry -- pretty much throughout his CIA career, and regardless of who his particular supervisors happen to be -- that those in authority over him were in his view constantly engaged in some kind of plot against him, and against the truth being known on this and that estimative question.

In November 1970, Mr. Adams was detailed for indefinite temporary duty to my office, the Special Research Staff, from his parent office, the Office

of Economic Research of the CIA. He remained an OER officer, occupying a position on their table of organization, though for so long as he remained ^{25X1A} with my ^{25X1A} staff, his immediate supervisors were Mr [REDACTED] [REDACTED] Deputy, and then in turn, myself. Early in 1971, and in concert with the Office of the Deputy Director of Intelligence (the supervisory office over both OER and SRS), I commissioned Mr. Adams to do a thorough and objective study on the development of Communism in Cambodia, politically and militarily. I asked that Mr. Adams complete this study by mid-1971. He agreed. The question of Cambodian Communist O.B. would be one aspect, but only one aspect of that much broader paper.

In June 1971, it came to my attention that Mr. Adams had distributed a short memorandum of his own on the question of Cambodian Communist O.B. to various other offices of the CIA, without my prior knowledge or consent, or any knowledge of what estimates he had made in that O.B. memorandum.

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In consequence and at my initiative, [REDACTED] arranged and attended an informal meeting between (a) Mr. Adams; (b) his fellow analysts from OER, that office which had long been charged with responsibility within CIA for Indochina O.B.; and (c) Indochina analysts from other CIA offices. Even though Mr. Adams was working on the large, broad paper on Communism in Cambodia for me, my Staff was and is not one whose responsibilities include Indochina O.B. In any event at this informal meeting, held on 22 June 1971, Mr. Adams received a good hearing for his particular theses concerning Cambodian Communist O.B., Mr. [REDACTED] subsequently reporting to me that there had been considerable sympathy among these officers with Mr. Adams' general thesis that existing CIA estimates on Cambodian Communist O.B. were too low.

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On 24 June 1971, [REDACTED] told Mr. Adams that, having had a decent and responsive hearing for his O.B. theses, he was to focus his energies on his assigned research project on the broader paper

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we had earlier assigned him, and that his deadline for completing the paper was extended. M [REDACTED] and I also told him, that except for routine matters, he was not henceforth to do any more lobbying for his own particular O.B. judgments elsewhere in the CIA, without our expressed prior knowledge and consent.

The remainder of 1971 and the early weeks of 1972 saw Mr. Adams continuing to work on the broad project we had given him, but failing to complete it, months beyond his original deadline. In short, the paper -- which was to have been completed in mid-1971, was not actually published until February 1972. At that time, the paper had been reviewed carefully by all the other offices of CIA having responsibilities for such questions. All were in general accord with it, and considered it a good job, as did I. One point at issue in that paper, however, remained that of the Cambodian Communist O.B. question. Mr. Adams and his OER colleagues still could not agree, though in the process of coordination he had been able to get them

to raise their Cambodian Communist O.B. substantially -- to new, higher figures which appeared in the final, February 1972, published version of our SRS paper.

Mr. Adams thus had been able to sell much of his O.B. thesis to his fellow specialists. They did not in the end buy his OB estimates 100%. But this did not constitute "rejection," nor did it lead to any retribution whatsoever against Mr. Adams. His were simply the views of one analyst, and available data did not substantiate his estimates, or anyone else's, as "the truth." Moreover, at that time Mr. Adams had meanwhile depreciated his estimative credibility among his fellow analysts, including myself, by having made other, wildly pessimistic estimates, concerning the course of battle in Indochina, which had not been borne out by events. 25X1A

I repeat that at no time did [REDACTED] or I ever order Mr. Adams to work seven days a week, nor did we punish him in any way for either his particular estimates or the manner in which he conducted himself. I do recall that at one point,

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though I do not recall exactly when, that Mr. Adams mentioned casually to Mr. [REDACTED] and me that he had been working every weekend for the last several weeks. I also recall that this came as a complete surprise at the time to Mr. [REDACTED] and myself, and that we told him then that we had never ordered him to any such duty. My surmise at that time, and at the present time, is that this may have been the result of earlier offhand remarks by Mr. [REDACTED] and me, to Mr. Adams, that if we were in his shoes, and if we were as far behind in our work as he, we would work like demons, even if it took weekends, in order to try to establish maximum respect as an effective analyst who could come somewhat close in meeting deadlines.

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These remarks had been meant for Mr. Adam's own good, inasmuch as his prior record in meeting deadlines, in all CIA offices, had been a poor one indeed. If, then, Mr. Adams had been working weekends at the time, it was to try to finish up assigned

research for us, which by that time was months and months overdue. It had not been "ordered," and it bore no relation at all to his previous O.B. or other estimates. In other words, if there was any weekend duty involved, it stemmed from Mr. Adams' own dilatoriness and not from vindictiveness on my part or that of the CIA.

25X1A My above comments are substantiated by Mr. [REDACTED] and by available records in our office files concerning Mr. Adams' performance while on loan to my office.

If so desired, I am prepared to make the above statements under oath to the Senate Committee.

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Aide Quits C.I.A., Impugning Its Honesty

By BERNARD GWERTZMAN
Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, May 17—An expert on Indochina resigned from the Central Intelligence Agency today, charging the intelligence community with "grossly" underestimating the size of the insurgency in Cambodia and with refusing to admit that the conflict there was a civil war.

Samuel A. Adams, in a resignation statement to the C.I.A. that he also gave to The New York Times, also said that the intelligence community was "neither honest enough nor thorough enough" in its work on Indochina.

Mr. Adams's views were disputed by experts in both the State Department and the C.I.A., who stuck with the official analysis, shared by the Pentagon, that the insurgent force of 40,000 to 50,000 is almost totally dependent on North Vietnam, and responsive to Hanoi's will.

Rebels Almost 'Independant'

In an interview, Mr. Adams took direct issue with the official view of both the size and control of the rebel force.

He said that the Cambodian insurgents were "virtually independent" of Hanoi and that they numbered 200,000, of whom as many as 100,000 were organized into regular units. He also asked there were "no more" than 2,000 North Vietnamese with the insurgents, specialists in such work as mine-laying and engineering.

The size and control of the rebel force is an issue that underlies congressional efforts to cut off funds for the continued American bombing of Cambodia in support of the Lon Nol Government. The Administration had defended the raids as necessary to offset the North Vietnamese involvement in Cambodia.



The New York Times

Samuel A. Adams

Moreover, the Administration has also tended to describe the Cambodian insurgents as a poorly organized force that could be handled by the Lon Nol forces of 200,000 if not for North Vietnam's aid.

Nixon Statement Recalled

For example, President Nixon in his recent State of the World Message repeatedly referred to Hanoi's "aggression" in Cambodia. And Secretary of State William P. Rogers, in a recent appearance before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, said the Lon Nol Government was opposed by a force of 70,000—35,000 Cambodians and 35,000 North Vietnamese.

Mr. Adams, in recent days, has been briefing such antiwar Senators as George S. McGovern, Democrat of South Dakota, Frank Church, Democrat of Idaho, and Charles McC. Ma-

thias Jr., Republican of Maryland, on his views and he has been invited to testify before a Foreign Relations sub-committee.

Critics of the bombing say that the fighting there is essentially a civil war between Cambodians and that the United States had no business intervening.

The C.I.A. refused to comment on Mr. Adams's resignation.

Mr. Adams, a 10-year veteran of the agency, also was involved in a dispute in 1967 over the size of the Vietcong force in South Vietnam.

He insisted that it was 600,000, while the official estimate was 275,000. He said that his figure was accepted as the accurate one in 1968 after the Tet offensive.

In March, Mr. Adams testified for the defense in the Pentagon Papers trial of Dr. Daniel Ellsberg and Anthony J. Russo Jr.

He said that some of the highly classified documents were based on inaccurate and perhaps deliberately misleading information, thus making them of no importance to enemy intelligence.

'Repeated Misjudgments'

In his resignation statement, Mr. Adams said his "main reason" for leaving was "the belief that U.S. intelligence has been neither honest enough nor thorough enough in conducting research on the war in Indochina."

"The failures in research have led to repeated misjudgments of the nature and strength of our adversaries there," he said.

He also cited his "inability" to correct the situation.

"Since 1967, I have submitted complaints about the integrity and completeness of research to the inspector general of the C.I.A. and the U.S. Army to the National Security Council, and to the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board," he said. "My criticisms were met with evasion, delay, and sometimes threat. As far as I can determine, they were largely fruitless."

Mr. Adams, who has written a history of the Cambodian Communist movement for the agency, said there was "no disagreement" that Hanoi supplied most of the insurgent war material. But said that Hanoi's control over the insurgents was much less than that stated by the Administration. He lik-